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Reference

Security, data and compliance in Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS)

Security controls, supported requirements, hosting and limitations of Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS).

Applies to Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS) as it works today. Moraph updates the platform continuously, and this page is reviewed when it changes.

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On this page
  1. Security controls
  2. No key values in the application
  3. Single sign-on and role-based access
  4. Two-person integrity
  5. Encryption and keys
  6. Complete audit trail
  7. Your authority, cleared support
  8. Requirements it supports
  9. Where it runs
  10. Limitations

How Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS) protects data and supports your compliance obligations.

Security controls

No key values in the application

The system records identifiers, holdings and events. Key values stay in the hardware security module, fill devices and end cryptographic units, never in the application database.

Single sign-on and role-based access

Users sign in through your identity provider, and what each person can see and do follows their role and account; issuing key is separate from approving its use.

Two-person integrity

Actions your procedures require two people for are enforced by the system, and both identities are recorded.

Encryption and keys

Records are encrypted at rest and in transit, with keys Moraph staff cannot use without explicit, time-bound authorization.

Complete audit trail

Every view, change, issue, load, destruction and report is logged with the person and time, and cannot be edited.

Your authority, cleared support

On classified networks the system is installed and operated under your authority. Support tickets for defense and intelligence clients are handled only by US citizens with active clearances.

Requirements it supports

  • NIST SP 800-57 Part 1, Recommendation for Key Management
  • NIST SP 800-130, A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems
  • NIST SP 800-152, A Profile for U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems
  • FIPS 140-3, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
  • DoD Instruction 8523.01, Communications Security (COMSEC)
  • CNSSI 4005, Safeguarding Communications Security (COMSEC) Facilities and Materials

The product supports these requirements; meeting them remains your organization's responsibility.

Where it runs

  • Client-hosted on your networks: Installed in your environment, including classified networks, and operated under your authority and within your own authorization.
  • Disconnected and tactical sites: Local instances at sites with limited connectivity record holdings and loads offline and synchronize with the account when a connection is available.
  • Moraph cloud, United States: For unclassified commercial key inventories, available hosted in Moraph's United States region where your policy allows.
  • With a managed service: Optionally supported by a Moraph managed service for administration and integration upkeep, with staff who hold the clearances your environment requires.

Limitations

  • It does not produce government-issued keying material. Keys for national security systems come from your government key management infrastructure; the system accounts for them but does not replace that infrastructure.
  • Key generation is limited to unclassified and commercial keys, generated in a FIPS 140-3 validated hardware security module that you provide and designate.
  • Moraph does not claim accreditation or authorization of the system for any classified environment. Use on classified networks requires your organization's own authorization and is operated under your authority.
  • It does not load key into devices or zeroize them. People do that with fill devices and the equipment itself; the system records it.
  • Revocation after a compromise depends on people acting on the controlling authority's direction. The system shows who must act and tracks confirmation, but cannot reach into devices to remove key.
  • Reports to your government key management infrastructure are prepared for your account manager to submit; the system does not submit them on your behalf.
  • The accuracy of holdings depends on loads, transfers and destruction being recorded when they happen, especially at disconnected sites that synchronize later.
  • It is not a COMSEC incident reporting authority. Decisions about whether an incident occurred and what it requires belong to your controlling authority and the officials your procedures name.
Note

Company-wide controls, independent audits (SOC 2 Type II and ISO/IEC 27001) and data residency are described in the Moraph Trust Center, where you can request the evidence pack.

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